To what is khrushchev referring in this statement

Agreement between our two countries would be insufficient. However, we should influence the Laotian forces so that a truly neutral government could be established. Khrushchev said that he believed that the United States had no economic interest in Laos. The President had mentioned yesterday US strategic interests in connection with Taiwan.

But this, as was mentioned yesterday, could mean that the United States could also take [Page ] over Crimea because that would of course improve its strategic position too. Such policy should be cast away and a reasonable policy should be adopted.

In any event, the two Foreign Ministers could discuss the details of the Laotian question. They should be locked in a room and told to find a solution. Gromyko interjected that the Palais des Nations in Geneva was a big place with a lot of rooms.

The President said that he wanted to make a comment on Mr. He said that this action was taken when representatives of the Soviet Union and the UK were discussing in Moscow the question of effecting a cease-fire in Laos. When it became evident that no progress had been made the action was taken in order to prevent the situation from deteriorating further and to ensure a more favorable situation in which the conference could proceed. This is the kind of thing that happens when both sides are involved, and the United States would wish to avoid such developments.

Khrushchev then suggested that the questions of disarmament, nuclear tests and Germany be discussed now because otherwise there would not be enough time to do it. The President replied that he wanted to make a final comment on the Laotian situation. He said that he was anxious to get the US military out of Laos. He had not supported and had been even reluctant to consider a landing of Marines, because he recognized that such action would entail retaliation and counteraction and thus peace in that area might be endangered.

What he wanted to see in that area was an effective cease-fire and peaceful settlement. He said perhaps Mr. Khrushchev could use his influence on Gromyko to persuade him to cooperate in bringing about an effective cease-fire in Laos and let the ICC verify the cease-fire in an effective manner.

That was the basis on which the United States had agreed to come to the conference. The President then suggested that perhaps the Secretary and Gromyko could discuss this question during lunch.

Khrushchev said he could add little to what had already been said. He agreed that a cease-fire should be sought. However, other questions should not be delayed by lack of a cease-fire. The point is that the situation at front lines is always unstable and even a shot fired accidentally by a soldier could be regarded by the other side as a violation of the cease-fire.

Therefore, other questions should not be made contingent upon a cease-fire. However, the President should not misunderstand [Page ] this position. The USSR believes that the question of a cease-fire should be handled on a priority basis, but the basic question is to bring about agreement among the three forces in Laos, so that the formation of a truly neutral government could be secured. Khrushchev agreed that no normal conditions for settlement would exist in the absence of a cease-fire.

However, he was not aware of any fighting going on; if the United States had contrary information, it should be verified. Gromyko remarked that the ICC was already in Laos and that it could act by agreement of both sides.

In response to an inquiry by the Secretary, Mr. Gromyko clarified that what he meant by both sides were the two sides fighting in Laos. The ICC should not be granted the rights of a supragovernment. The President reiterated his hope that the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko could discuss this problem briefly during lunch.

Khrushchev then addressed himself to the question of nuclear weapon tests. He said he would not go into any details because the positions of the two sides were well known. Furthermore, he was not familiar with all the details of this intricate problem. However, there were two basic questions: 1 the number of suspicious events to be inspected and 2 organization of control.

The Soviet Union cannot accept such controls as have been suggested so far. The events in the Congo taught the Soviet Union a lesson. Before those events the Soviet Union might have signed a treaty like the one suggested. However, the events in the Congo indicated that the UN appears to be able to act against the interests of individual states. The Congo had invited UN troops and those troops acted against the interests of the Congolese Government. So if there is a single chairman of the control commission Mr.

Khrushchev was obviously referring to the administrator he will be able to set the policy. The US would not agree to having a Communist chairman and that is understandable.

If it did then the Soviet Union could accept a single chairman administrator. But the Soviet Union cannot accept a neutral chairman; after all, Hammarskjold is also a neutral and an intelligent one at that. He is not the worst neutral possible. One should try to imagine a situation, Mr. Khrushchev said, where he, as Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, would have to subject his actions to such a commission administrator. The people of the Soviet Union would never accept such a situation and if the United States wants him to be fired then it should pursue this line.

The Soviet Union does not seek control over the control organization but it does not wish the United States to have such control either. This is why the USSR has proposed a three-man body. Such an arrangement would not be prejudicial to any of the sides. Khrushchev said that he believed that the work of other international organizations should be organized along the same lines. He said that the United States was now in the majority in the UN , but times may change—one cannot say when— [Page ] and the US may find itself in a minority.

The UN is not a parliament, it is an international organization and the majority rule has no place there. Each group of countries should be equally represented, so that a balance of forces be established and that no one be able to pursue a policy prejudicial to any other side. Referring to the number of inspections, Mr. Khrushchev said that three inspections a year would be sufficient.

A larger number would be tantamount to intelligence, something the Soviet Union cannot accept. Khrushchev then said that he wanted to link the question of nuclear tests with disarmament. If agreement could be reached on disarmament, then the USSR could agree to any controls and it would then drop the troika arrangement and the requirement for unanimity.

Under the conditions of general and complete disarmament control must be most extensive so that no country could arm itself clandestinely. If there were general and complete disarmament there would be no question of espionage because there would be no armaments. Then there would be no secrets and all doors must be open so that complete verification could be ensured.

This would include nuclear plants. In view of the fact that apparently no agreement can be reached on the question of nuclear tests, this question should be linked to disarmament. The disarmament group should combine the two questions and work out a general plan. Given good will, two years should be sufficient to develop an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Khrushchev said that he could give the President an aide-memoire setting forth the Soviet position on this question. The aide-memoire was received from the Soviets after the meeting. The President said that he wanted to ask Mr.

Khrushchev whether he believed it to be impossible to find any person that would be neutral both to the US and the USSR. Khrushchev replied in the affirmative. The President then said that the result of the Soviet proposal could be compared to a situation where if he were living in this room and Mr. The President then said that a treaty along such lines could not be confirmed by the Senate. In sending any treaty to the Senate the President would have to give assurance that the treaty provides if not for a fool-proof control system, at least for a reasonable deterrent against violations.

However, if the Soviet proposal were accepted, no such assurance [Page ] could be given. Likewise, how could Mr. Khrushchev give such assurance to those people in his country who may think that the United States is testing clandestinely.

True, Mr. Khrushchev is in an advantageous position because of the open way in which the United States acts. Furthermore, the President continued, how can we inspect events in the Soviet Union if any such inspection would be subject to Soviet approval? Under such an agreement any party that might have tested clandestinely would simply refuse to accept inspection in the area where the test had occurred.

Khrushchev referred to his statement about three inspections a year to verify suspicious events and also noted that the President had failed to address himself to his statement regarding the dropping of the troika proposal if nuclear tests were linked with disarmament. If this arrangement were adopted, then full control could be exercised any time and at any place. Khrushchev went on to say that a nuclear test ban alone would not be very important to the national security of the people.

The danger of war would remain, because the production of nuclear energy, rockets, and bombs would continue full blast. What people want is peace. Therefore, agreement should be reached on general and complete disarmament.

Then the troika would be dropped and the USSR would subscribe to any controls developed by the US, even without looking at the document. The President said that he agreed that a nuclear test ban would not of itself lessen the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the USSR and the US. Nor would it reduce the production of such weapons. However, a test ban would make development of nuclear weapons by other countries less likely, although, of course, no one can guess what will happen in the future.

At this time, the United States and the USSR possess great stocks of nuclear weapons; Great Britain possesses certain quantities of such weapons and France is also getting some capability. If we fail to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban then other countries will undoubtedly launch a nuclear weapons program.

While a nuclear test ban would be no certain guarantee against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would certainly impede such proliferation. If no agreement is reached, then in a few years there might be ten or even fifteen nuclear powers. So in considering this question of what Mr. Khrushchev calls espionage one should balance its risks against the risks involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we are successful in reaching agreement on a nuclear test ban then it will certainly at least put a brake on the spread of nuclear weapons.

However, practice has demonstrated that this logic is not quite correct because while the three powers are negotiating in Geneva, France simply spits at them and goes on testing.

Thus if there is no link between a nuclear test ban and disarmament other countries may say that they are in an unequal position and might act like France. Other countries may say that if the great powers possess stockpiles of nuclear weapons they should also acquire such stockpiles. On the other hand, if there were disarmament, then nuclear weapons would be eliminated and other countries would be in an equal position and would not have to spend money on the development of nuclear weapons.

General and complete disarmament is the most radical means of preventing war. The Soviet Union has always regarded the question of a nuclear test ban merely as a small step toward general and complete disarmament. But let us now begin with the main issue and include the test ban in it. The President said he agreed that a test ban would not be a basic part, but it would be a most important part.

He said that the treaty as drafted now provides for abrogation of the treaty if any country associated with any party to the treaty should conduct tests. The United States does not support French testing. We hope that once a treaty has been concluded most other countries will join in it. The question of a nuclear test ban is a relatively easy problem to resolve because the controls required are based on scientific instrumentation, such as seismographs, etc.

So why not start with this relatively easy question. The President then inquired whether the Soviet conception was that if we used the term general and complete disarmament—or general and comprehensive disarmament as used by us last year—the process would be carried out step by step with the necessary parallel inspection.

Or is it the Soviet view that we would simply announce that goal as an objective of national policy and countries would carry out inspection on their own. Khrushchev replied he wanted to make a complaint: The President apparently had not read the Soviet proposals with sufficient attention. Otherwise, he would know that the Soviet proposals provide for disarmament in stages and for control in stages. The President then inquired whether this was to be understood that, if both sides accepted general and complete disarmament and agreed to reduce their armed forces, the number of their aircraft or submarines, or to disarm outer space, the Soviet Union would accept inspection any place in the USSR.

In other words, the President inquired further, if general and complete disarmament were accepted as a commitment of national policy [Page ] and a nuclear test ban were included in the first stage, would that mean that the test ban would be subject to inspection without a veto?

Khrushchev replied that in that event he would try to persuade the President not to start with this measure because it is not the most important one. Khrushchev replied that any other measure would be acceptable, such as, for instance, prohibition of nuclear weapons, prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons, or elimination of military and missile bases. At this point Mr. Gromyko corrected the interpreter saying that Mr.

Khrushchev had not mentioned prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. However, Mr. Khrushchev confirmed that he had mentioned this item. The Soviet proposals on disarmament contain all the details and there is logic in those proposals. The proposals also provide for complete control. In any event, both sides should try to reach agreement on the priority of individual measures so that neither side would have its interests prejudiced by the other.

The President said that Mr. Khrushchev appeared to feel that a link should be established between a nuclear test ban and disarmament and that these two questions are inter-related and should be discussed together.

We, on the other hand, believe that a nuclear test ban would be if not the most important step, at least a very significant step and would facilitate a disarmament agreement. There is a Chinese proverb saying that a thousand-mile journey begins with one step. So let us make that step. Khrushchev rejoined by saying that the President apparently knew the Chinese very well but that he too knew them quite well.

To this the President replied that Mr. Khrushchev might get to know them even better. Khrushchev retorted that he already knew them very well. Khrushchev said that the USSR could agree to a nuclear test ban provided it was subject to the troika arrangement. The President then said that it appeared to him that the conversation was back where it had started. Therefore, he wanted to conclude this discussion by saying that the United States is greatly concerned by the uninspected moratorium that has been going on for three years in connection with the negotiations.

This indicates how long it takes to reach agreements. The prospect of an indefinite continuance of a moratorium without controls is a matter of great concern to the United States. Therefore, it is difficult to envisage how the question of nuclear tests could be included in disarmament negotiations, which we hope will be successful but which will probably require a long time.

Perhaps it would be best to go back to Geneva to make another effort and to see what each of us should do in this matter. Perhaps then the conference might be recessed [Page ] or some other action taken.

The interpreter later explained that Khrushchev was referring to the inevitable course of history, when one society — such as feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and then communism — gives way to another. If one society dies off, somebody's got to be there to bury it, " Sukhodrev said during an interview with RT.

Although nothing was lost in translation with Sukhodrev, his colleagues often pointed out that he made Soviet leaders sound more educated, noble, and smart. He was also recognized as a master of his craft who was able to switch effortlessly from a British accent to an American one. The interpreter said that unlike Khrushchev, who was a very curious person, it was difficult to interest Brezhnev. Once on board Richard Nixon's plane, Brezhnev woke to see the spectacular Grand Canyon — and wasn't impressed at all.

But, according to Sukhodrev, he liked gifts, especially cars. When given a Lincoln by Nixon, Brezhnev drove it at high speed with great pleasure. Later, in Moscow, Sukhodrev helped the leader deal with a repair parts catalog. Sukhodrev spoke of his work with various European leaders. It became her main characteristic and merit. I can compare him to the presidents I've met all the way up to Kennedy, who also had wonderful and very literal American English and spoke perfect language," Sukhodrev told RT.

Sukhodrev retired in the mids. A memorial service will be held on Monday. Even though the Soviet archives were briefly and partially opened to researchers in the s, the lack of official archival material remains a problem, and the end of the Cold War only slightly diminished the anti-Soviet vitriol of most writing. Starting in the s, Soviet scholarship experienced a change.

Researchers for a time gained access to the Soviet archives, and studies emerged that historians J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. According to historians J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Other studies, from those of telephone directories in Leningrad to census data confirmed that previous estimates vastly overstated the size of the repression.

Still other studies discovered that the repression did not simply emanate from the top but developed a life of its own in factories, local party and government organizations and the army, where the accused were most often officials and where the repression, as ironic as it sounds, was accompanied by growing democracy at the grassroots level. Also, the repression occurred in the context of economic problems, industrial sabotage, and plots against the regime.

Other studies provided a more nuanced view of Stalin, who emerged as less powerful, more competent, more hands-on, and more seriously theoretical than the brutal tyrant drawn by the totalitarian paradigm. Furr aimed further than any previous revisionist account.

This turned out to be not quite the case. The book begins with nine chapters in which Furr, a Montclair State University professor who is fluent in Russian, tries to rebut the sixty-one revelations that Khrushchev made in his speech. Nearly half the book is taken up by an appendix, in which Furr supplies quotations from primary and secondary source material to support his argument. Furr shows how misleading this accusation was. First, the existence of a cult of personality was no revelation since Party leaders had discussed it for years.

Secondly, Stalin not only did not foster the cult but expressed distaste with it, or at least with some of its excesses. Third, all Party leaders bore responsibility for the glorification of Stalin. Indeed, no one surpassed Khrushchev when it came to sycophancy. Yet, by trying to absolve Stalin entirely for the cult around him, Furr strains credibility.

Stalin may have opposed renaming Moscow, but he apparently did not object when scores of other cities, towns, streets, squares, parks, factories and so on were named after him and when his pictures and statues became ubiquitous.

Another Khrushchev lie that Furr exposes concerns the so-called Lenin testament. Furr might also have pointed out that, however critical Lenin was of Stalin, he was even more critical of Trotsky and other top leaders. Furr convincingly rebuts many other Khrushchev statements. Some of the falsehoods are trivial. Many are not. Furr points out that this view is completely at variance with those who worked most closely with Stalin, including Marshall Georgii K.

Zhukov, who even after Stalin had demoted him praised his wartime leadership. Here, Furr makes his most important contribution, though, it is a contribution beset with problems of its own.

Throughout the secret speech, Khrushchev attempted to place the entire blame for the repression on Stalin and Beria. Furr convincingly argues that putting exclusive blame on Stalin and Beria is entirely misleading. For example, far from repressing dissent, Stalin showed great tolerance for disagreement. More importantly, no one had greater or more direct responsibility for the repression than the heads of the NKVD, first Genrikh Yagoda and subsequently Nicolai Ezhov sometimes spelled Yezhov , and Party first secretaries like Khrushchev.

The memoirs of Party leader Dmitrii Shepilov completely supported Furr on this point. In these lamentations there was the added twist that the men held responsible for the deaths of our glorious communists were, of course, Stalin, and his colleagues, but never Khrushchev himself.

Moreover, Furr points out that though Khrushchev blamed Stalin for the repression, he completely ignored that Stalin deserved credit for ending the repression in and for the punishment of Yagoda and Ezhov for their excesses. Historian Boris A. Starkov recounted that in A. Zhdanov, A. Andreev, K. Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich, A. Mikoyan and V. In short, Furr has come up with a valid and momentous insight that one of the most influential speeches in history was riddled with lies, distortions and fabrications.

First, there is a conceptual problem. The point of studying history is to understand what happened. Instead, he often resorts to a tendentious and one-sided reading of the evidence, to innuendos and speculation, to overblown and hyperbolic language, and to unsupported allegations of his own.

To call every Khrushchev revelation a lie has dramatic appeal and a figurative truth, but no one in their right mind could buy this as literal truth, because no one in their right mind could imagine Khrushchev or anyone else speaking for hours before a congress of the Communist Party about revelations that contained nothing but falsehoods. Even Furr himself does not believe this. Moreover, when the evidence to make his case is unavailable, Furr slips into the role of a dubious defense attorney who nitpicks the evidence, badgers witnesses and kicks up sand.

The day after the assassination, Stalin went to Leningrad and took personal charge of the investigation, which ended up implicating the opposition leaders, G. Zinoviev and L. Kamenev, and set off the Moscow Trials and associated repression. Furr is right on the first count but fails to prove the second.

Moreover, his refutation is superficial and tendentious. Furr does not do this. He does not even identify two of the historians he quotes, Pavel Sudaplatov and Alla Kirilina. Furr neither provides their credentials though strong , nor gives any reason that they are more credible though they are than Amy Knight or Robert Conquest.